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De Jure Segregation’s Role in the Miseducation of African Americans: Protecting Affirmative
Action Admissions Programs
Goldie Bryant*
I.

Introduction

The crisis of unequal educational opportunities for African Americans continues to be a
dilemma in the United States.1 The transgenerational connection is unbroken between slavery,
the systematic denial of education, mass incarceration, the depression of income and wealth
accumulation through restricted job and homeownership opportunities, legal segregation in
housing and in schools, and today’s largely segregated educational system that is failing to educate
African Americans.2 Unconstitutional laws and policies at the federal, state, and local government
levels sanctioned de jure segregation—segregation “existing by right or according to law.”3 As a
result of de jure segregation, African American students today disproportionately attend
segregated schools with more concentrated poverty than white students.4 Research shows that
“systemic and racial isolation” in schools is widespread in American cities and is associated with
the racial academic achievement gap. 5 Schools in poor communities have less resources, less

*

1

J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., New York University.

See Ronald Brownstein, The Challenge of Educational Inequality, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/05/education-inequality-takes-center-stage/483405/.
2
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 386–95 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the position
of African Americans in America after “centuries of unequal treatment”).
3
See Richard Rothstein, Commentary, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools, and Segregated
Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/theracial-achievement-gap-segregated-schools-and-segregated-neighborhoods-a-constitutional-insult/.
De Jure,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Pocket ed. 2016).
4
Janie
Boschma,
Separate
and
Still
Unequal,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
1,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/03/separate-still-unequal/471720/; Brownstein supra note 1
(noting three-fourths of African American students attend majority low-income schools as opposed to only one third
of white students).
5
Janie Boschma & Ronald Brownstein, The Concentration of Poverty in American Schools, ATLANTIC (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/02/concentration-poverty-american-schools/471414/.
1

educated parents, and lower quality teachers with higher turnover rates. 6 The substandard
segregated education provided to African Americans today is a lingering “badge” of slavery
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the failure of legislators to effectively address
segregated educational inequality violates the equal protection of African Americans as promised
in the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Because government action promoted de jure segregation, which
is responsible for the resulting miseducation of African Americans—as opposed to private societal
discrimination, the government has a compelling interest in remedying the harmful effects of its
actions.8
Despite the crisis of African American miseducation, the Justice Department’s civil rights
division is focusing its limited resources on investigating affirmative action admissions policies at
the university level. 9 In August 2017, The New York Times exposed a Justice Department
document seeking internal lawyers for potential litigation in connection with “intentional racebased discrimination” in admissions policies.10 The term “intentional race-based discrimination”
suggests the new administration’s Justice Department intends to challenge existing affirmative
action admissions policies that are considered by some to discriminate against white applicants.11
The Justice Department’s actions, coupled with the likely appointment of one or more additional
conservative Justices to the Supreme Court during the Trump administration, do not bode well for
the protection of affirmative action admissions programs.

Instead, the very foundation of

affirmative action in higher education will be challenged by attacking Harvard College’s “holistic”
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admissions program, the model affirmative action admissions program endorsed by Justice
Powell’s 1978 opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.12
The ironic trend of using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prevent discrimination against non-minorities as the basis for stifling affirmative action programs,
which address the staggering educational inequality experienced by African Americans in the
United States, will likely continue under the current administration’s leadership.13 Rather than
using equal protection for necessary remedial reforms to uplift African Americans from the
entrenched subordination they have been subjected to, the guarantee of equal protection is being
used to maintain the “racial status quo.”14
In addition to Supreme Court rulings over the past few decades limiting the consideration
of race in admissions policies,15 the backlash against affirmative action can be seen at the state
level where eight states, so far, have banned the use of race-based affirmative action. 16 The
combined actions of the Court, the federal government, and state governments indicate a serious
threat to affirmative action admissions programs and, in turn, a serious threat to mitigating the
unequal educational opportunities for African Americans.
Understanding the legislative intent behind the “reconstruction amendments” provides an
essential historical context for understanding the unique relationship between the equal protection
laws of the United States and African Americans. 17 Not only did the Thirteenth Amendment
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abolish slavery, but the Supreme Court held that the amendment empowered Congress “to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”18
This interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment allows for the possibility of using the amendment
for civil rights reforms, especially for African Americans who were the targeted beneficiaries of
the amendment.19 Despite the race-neutral language of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court
and scholars alike have recognized, there is no question that its framers intended to protect the
newly freed slaves from states that would use laws to deny the former slaves equal citizenship.20
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were specifically intended to abolish slavery, destroy
all “badges and incidents of slavery” that would create second-class citizens, and prevent
government actions that would violate the rights of African Americans. 21 The original promises
of these amendments have yet to be fully realized for the descendants of slavery.
This Comment proposes a different approach to assessing the constitutionality of
affirmative action admissions policies in relation to African Americans. It argues that remedying
the impact of unconstitutional de jure segregation on the miseducation of African Americans is
both a compelling government interest and a constitutional obligation that requires protecting
affirmative action admissions programs benefitting African Americans under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Part II explores the evolving interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause as it relates to safeguarding African Americans’ rights. Part III reviews the history of racebased affirmative action admissions decisions, which were based on the faulty strict scrutiny
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standard analysis and where the role of de jure segregation’s impact was never addressed. Part IV
examines how applying the strict scrutiny standard weakened affirmative action admissions
policies by focusing on racial classifications rather than on the underlying structural inequalities
facing African Americans. Part V analyzes the relationship between de jure segregation and the
miseducation of African Americans. Part VI explains why the higher education of African
Americans is a compelling government interest and a constitutional obligation. Finally, Part VII
concludes that the government has an obligation to remedy the impact of unconstitutional de jure
segregation on the miseducation of African Americans and that protecting and strengthening
affirmative action admissions programs is critical to ensuring equality by dismantling the current
unequal educational system.
II.

The Evolution of Equal Protection and African Americans’ Rights

A. The Separate but Equal Doctrine
The Supreme Court failed to protect the civil rights of African Americans in Plessy v.
Ferguson. 22 By endorsing the “separate but equal doctrine,” the Court ensured that white
dominance would continue to be legally sanctioned so long as laws appeared to apply equally to
the races.23
On June 7, 1892, Plessy, who was 7/8 Caucasian and 1/8 African, paid for first-class rail
fare and attempted to sit in a whites-only section of an East Louisiana Railway car. 24 Plessy
refused to comply with the conductor’s orders to move to a colored section of the train, was
forcibly removed, and was then imprisoned and charged under an 1890 Louisiana Act requiring

22
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separate accommodations on trains for white and colored passengers, which had an exception for
“nurses attending to children of the other race.”25 Plessy challenged the act as unconstitutional on
the ground that it violated both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.26
The Supreme Court found that the act did not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment
because the Court interpreted the amendment as primarily abolishing slavery or involuntary
servitude and not as protecting “coloreds” from laws imposing “onerous disabilities and burdens”
or from laws interfering with their rights to “the pursuit of life, liberty, and property.”27 The Court
noted that legal distinctions between races were not only permissible in state statutes because the
distinctions had no impact on legal equality but that they “must always exist so long as white men
are distinguished from the other race by color.” 28 While this analysis of the Thirteenth
Amendment narrowly defined its reach, the analysis clearly acknowledged the significance and
legality of racial distinctions between whites and African Americans.
The Court, however, determined that the Fourteenth Amendment applied in this case
because a “main purpose” of the amendment was to “establish the citizenship of the negro.”29 The
Court also stated that the amendment was intended to “enforce absolute equality of the two races
before the law” while not abolishing racial distinctions or enforcing social equality. 30 Using a
standard of reasonableness, the Court found that the enforced separation of the races (long held
valid in the creation of separate schools for whites and “coloreds”) did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment because the two races were equal under the law and the state legislatures were allowed
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to consider established customs and traditions in their efforts to preserve the “public peace” when
creating laws.31 Separate but equal was declared reasonable.32 By allowing state legislatures to
use customs and traditions to justify race-based laws, the Court gave states permission to continue
creating legislation that maintained white dominance by effectively disenfranchising African
Americans.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, acknowledged that the Louisiana statute’s obvious and known
purpose was to keep colored people out of white coaches “under the guise of giving equal
accommodation for whites and blacks.”33 Justice Harlan objected to the statute as violating the
“personal freedom of citizens” and reasoned that the “arbitrary separation of citizens” traveling on
public highways because of race was a “badge of servitude” and was not equal protection of the
law.34 The Justice astutely predicted that the decision would lead to more state laws designed to
defeat the purposes of the “recent amendments” to the Constitution, allowing “race hate” to be
legally sanctioned.35
B. Separate Educational Facilities as Inherently Unequal
Six decades after the flawed decision in Plessy, the Court had another opportunity to assess
the unconstitutionality of the “separate but equal doctrine” in Brown v. Board of Education, which
involved class actions in four states where African American students sought admission to
segregated public schools that either legally required or permitted racial segregation. 36 The
plaintiffs challenged the segregated public schools as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment arguing that segregated public schools were “not ‘equal’ and cannot be
made ‘equal.’”37 The three decisions adverse to the plaintiffs cited the Court’s “separate but equal”
doctrine announced in Plessy as justifying segregated public schools so long as the races were
provided with “substantially equal facilities.”38 A decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware
was the sole opinion favorable to the plaintiffs.39 The Delaware Court ordered admission of the
plaintiffs into the white schools because they were superior to the “Negro” schools, even while
agreeing with the “separate but equal” doctrine.40 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflicting decisions.41
While the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was offered as evidence of the
constitutional violation resulting from segregated public schools, the Court found the evidence
inconclusive because the amendment’s intended effect on public education was not clear
historically.42 Given the evolution of education from the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1868, to the Plessy decision in 1896, and finally to 1954, when Brown was decided, the Court
noted that it was necessary to consider present-day public education and its current place in
American society.43 Deeming education “perhaps the most important” state and local government
function, Chief Justice Warren concluded that, where provided, the opportunity for a public
education was “a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”44
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In deciding whether the “separate but equal” doctrine applied, the Court determined that
the decision could not rest on simply comparing “tangible factors” of the segregated schools such
as facilities, curricula, and teacher qualifications.45 Instead, the Court decided that it was necessary
to look at the “effect of segregation itself on public education.”46 In evaluating the effects of
segregation on African American children, the Court ironically relied on the Kansas court’s
findings that legally sanctioned segregation had “a detrimental effect upon the colored children,”
impedes their “educational and mental development,” and deprives them from benefitting from
integrated schools. 47 The Court declared that “separate but equal” did not apply to public
education because segregated public schools were “inherently unequal” and, therefore, segregated
schools violated equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.48
The Court reasoned that public education evolved between 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, and 1954, when Brown was decided.49 The Court, therefore, concluded
that it must view public education through a contemporary lens.50 This reasoning can and should
be extended to the present when determining the effects of de jure segregation on public education
and the role of public higher education in American society because today’s bachelor’s degree is
arguably equivalent to the high school diploma of the 1950s. Given the continued evolution of
education in American society from 1954 to today, the finding in Brown that education is one of
the most important functions of state and local governments should be extended to public higher
education and require equal access to all.

45
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C. Modern Interpretation of Equal Protection: Maintaining the Status Quo
After the Brown decision, along with pressure from the Civil Rights Movement, Congress
enacted laws and the Executive branch created school desegregation guidelines to dismantle the
unequal, segregated public education system.51 Equal protection laws promoting “fair procedures”
and “individual liberty” acknowledged and addressed violations of the civil rights of African
Americans and other subordinated groups.52 The guarantee of “equal protection” as decided in
Brown promoted reform across the nation.53 The Brown decision and the reforms that followed
led to a backlash and the election of presidents who promised to appoint Justices who would disrupt
the trajectory of equal protection law. 54 The Nixon election in 1968 and re-election in 1972
followed campaigns incorporating anti-civil rights messages that appealed to white voters. 55
Nixon honored his campaign promises and appointed four Justices that changed the direction of
the Supreme Court and equal protection law.56
Beginning in the 1970s, the Court redefined discrimination as “forbidden classifications”
as opposed to the previous focus on legally sanctioned subordination.57 Focusing on merely the
use of racial classifications—and disregarding the underlying purpose of laws—served to equate
laws meant to aid subordinated groups with laws that intentionally “advantaged dominant
groups.”58 As a result, the Court began subjecting to strict scrutiny all laws that classified on the
basis of race.59 At the same time, the Court made it extremely difficult to challenge facially neutral
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laws that discriminated against minorities by requiring challenges to show that any disparate
impact upon minorities was motivated by state actors’ actual malice—an almost impossible
standard of proof.60 This approach severely limited the relevance of laws’ disparate impact on
minorities.61 The Court effectively began to use equal protection law to maintain the racial status
quo of inequality by subjecting affirmative action policies to the highest level of scrutiny, strict
scrutiny.62
The “colorblindness” approach to evaluating policies that use race-based classifications
claims that the Constitution is colorblind, and that whether the motives behind race-based laws are
benign or invidious is unknowable, and, therefore, the use of racial classifications is prohibited
unless strict scrutiny standards are met. 63 Under this approach to judicial review, legitimate
remedial goals of the challenged policies are considered irrelevant, and the policies will be suspect
simply because of the use of race as a classification.64
Meanwhile, the Court made it nearly impossible for non-whites to prove discrimination
from facially neutral laws under the “intent” doctrine, which requires plaintiffs to prove malice as
the state of mind of the accused government actor.65 Since this lenient standard of judicial review
was announced in the 1970s, the vast majority of discrimination claims by non-whites have been
rejected.66

60
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The same Court applied these two doctrines, “colorblindness” for affirmative action cases
and “intent” for discrimination cases, and effectively operated “to defeat challenges to, and
remedies for, discrimination against non-Whites.”67 The combining of the these doctrines, what
Ian Haney-Lopez has collectively termed “intentional blindness,” led to a Court in the 1990s that
did not see discrimination and ultimately allowed for the destruction of affirmative action.68 Over
the course of a few decades, equal protection law reversed direction in regards to protecting the
rights of African Americans and other subordinated groups.
III.

History of Race-Based Affirmative Action Admissions Decisions

A. Regents of California v. Bakke69
While heralded as a champion for the “diversity rationale,” which allows for the use of race
as a factor in admissions decisions to achieve a diverse student body, Bakke effectively “forced a
decoupling of the value of diversity from the realities of race past and present.”70 Justice Powell’s
opinion deemed the historical racial experiences of African Americans irrelevant and merely
endorsed the creation of a diverse student body as a compelling justification for affirmative action
admissions programs.71
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis used two admissions programs:
a regular admissions program to fill eighty-four places and a special admissions program to fill
sixteen places for “disadvantaged” minorities.72 Bakke, a white man, who was denied admission

67

Id. at 1784.
Haney-Lopez, supra note 13, at 1784–89.
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71
Id. at 283.
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in 1973 and 1974, sued claiming the medical school’s special program was discriminatory and
violated his equal rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 73

The medical school cross-

complained for a declaratory judgment that its admissions program was constitutional.74 The trial
court ruled that the special admissions program was illegal because it used a racial quota system
and that the university could not consider race in its admissions decisions.75 It did not, however,
order the school to admit Bakke.76 The California Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the
program violated the Constitution.77 But the court reversed the lower court by shifting the burden
of proof to the University to show that Bakke would not have been admitted to the school if the
special program had not existed and ultimately ordered the school to admit Bakke.78
While acknowledging that the framers originally intended for the Fourteenth Amendment
to address equal protection of the “Negro race,” Justice Powell noted the Court’s “crucial mission”
in recent decades was to interpret the Equal Protection Clause as applying to all people.79 Justice
Powell refused to extend the same approval of preferential classifications as in cases involving
school desegregation, employment discrimination, and sex discrimination to the University’s
special admissions program.80 The Justice distinguished the medical school’s special admissions
programs from prior decisions that remedied “clearly determined constitutional violations”
reasoning that the University failed to show that it had engaged in discriminatory practices
requiring remediation.81 Applying strict scrutiny because of the race-based classifications used in
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the special admissions program, Justice Powell determined that the medical school’s goal of aiding
minorities that the school “perceived as victims of ‘societal discrimination’” did not justify any
disadvantage on those, like Bakke, “who bear no responsibility” for the harms minorities have
suffered.82 Justice Powell failed to acknowledge or address why whites like Bakke had the right
to benefit from unchecked white privilege resulting from centuries of African American
subjugation.
Justice Powell ruled that the use of racial quotas in the medical school’s special admissions
program violated equal protection of individual rights. 83 Accepting the University’s goal of
attaining a diverse student body as a compelling interest, citing academic freedom and First
Amendment concerns, Justice Powell reversed the lower court and declared that using race as a
factor in admissions programs is constitutional as long as race is used as a “plus” factor and not a
determining factor.84 The Justice’s non-binding opinion relied heavily on Harvard College’s use
of race in its holistic admissions program and held it out as an example of the successful use of
race.85
Justice Marshall’s powerful dissent declared that the current position of African Americans
is the “tragic but inevitable consequence” of over two centuries of historical subordination of
African Americans, beginning with slavery and continuing through Jim Crow laws, enforced
segregation by the federal government under President Wilson, and the exclusion of African
Americans from public graduate and professional schools. 86 Justice Marshall concluded that
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“meaningful equality remains a distant dream” for African Americans. 87 He argued that
remedying the impact of the Nation’s past treatment of African Americans should not only be
considered “a state interest of the highest order,” but that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to prevent remedial programs. 88 While the Bakke opinion failed to acknowledge the
obvious and undeniable impact of historical subjugation on African Americans, Justice Marshall’s
separate opinion powerfully demonstrated the relevance of both de jure segregation and past
discrimination against African Americans in determining the existence of compelling government
interests in race-based remediation.
B. Hopwood v. Texas89
Demonstrating the fragility of the diversity rationale endorsed in Bakke, in 1996 the Fifth
Circuit rejected diversity as a compelling government interest when white applicants denied
admission into the University of Texas School of Law sued alleging that the affirmative action
admissions program violated their right to equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 90 The law school used separate admissions panels for whites and preferred
minorities, which applied different threshold scores with the intention of increasing the enrollment
of minority students.91
Applying strict scrutiny, the district court reviewed the admissions program and found that
attaining a diverse student body and remediating past discrimination in the state’s secondary school
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Id. at 395.
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system were compelling interests. 92 The district court, however, found that using separate
admissions panels violated the plaintiffs’ equal protection rights.93
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the University of Texas Law School could not use
race as a factor in its admissions process to create a diverse student body, to improve a hostile
environment, to repair the school’s reputation, or to mitigate effects of discrimination not directly
committed by the law school.94 While the district court found a compelling government interest
in attaining a diverse student body to justify the admissions program, the Court of Appeals declared
that achieving a diverse student body was not a compelling interest—declining to follow Justice
Powell’s non-binding view in Bakke.95 The court also limited the law school to addressing its
own discrimination and declared it could not remedy past discrimination in education by the state
of Texas more broadly even though eighty-five percent of the law students were residents of Texas
and likely products of the Texas educational system.96
The Court of Appeals interpreted the ultimate goal of the Fourteenth Amendment to be the
“end of racially-motivated state action” as opposed to remedying the effects of the de jure
subordination of African Americans and other minorities. 97 The court further reasoned that
because the de jure discrimination practiced by the law school, denying blacks admission, ended
in the 1960s, the law school’s past discrimination was sufficiently addressed.98 The court failed
to explain exactly what “sufficiently addressed” the admitted de jure discrimination.

The

Hopwood court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting racial classifications even
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when the intended purpose of the classification is to remedy the historical subordination of
minorities.99 The court failed to acknowledge the impact of historical de jure discrimination on
present day outcomes including that whites, while they may not have directly caused the past
discrimination, benefit from centuries of unequal treatment of African Americans and other
minorities.
C. Grutter v. Bollinger100
The Grutter decision provided a lifeline to affirmative action admissions programs by
finding a compelling interest in the diversity rationale.101 After being denied admission to the
University of Michigan Law School, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, sued alleging the
law school’s admissions policy discriminated against her because of her race violating her equal
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.102 The Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed
the district court, holding that the law school’s goal of a diverse student body was a compelling
interest and that the school’s use of race was narrowly tailored.103 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve conflicting judgments by the courts of appeals regarding the question of
whether achieving diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the use of racial classifications
in public universities’ admissions policies.104
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, endorsed Justice Powell’s view that student body
diversity is a compelling government interest, which justifies the use of race-based admissions
policies and held that the law school’s goal of achieving the educational benefits of a diverse

99
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student body was compelling.105 Analyzing whether the admissions policy was narrowly tailored
to pass strict scrutiny, the Court reiterated the requirement that race be used as one factor in a
broader conception of diversity and that applicants must receive individualized consideration. 106
Continuing the narrow tailoring analysis, Justice O’Connor determined that the law school had
considered race-neutral alternatives in order to achieve the desired diversity without sacrificing its
selectivity.107
Importantly, Justice O’Connor recognized both the importance of access to public
institutions of higher education and the reality that “race unfortunately still matters” in America.108
Even though Justice O’Connor acknowledged the reality that race still matters, she went on to
conclude that race-conscious admissions policies must necessarily be limited in order to comply
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose of prohibiting “governmentally imposed” race-based
discrimination. 109

She posited a twenty-five year expiration on the necessity of racial

classifications although she did not address how the underlying entrenched structural inequalities
would be resolved in such a short period.110
Justice Ginsburg, concurring, acknowledged that racial discrimination, both conscious and
unconscious, remains a reality and that minorities continue to receive “inadequate and unequal
educational opportunities” in inferior segregated schools.111 While both Justices O’Connor and
Ginsburg acknowledged the actual impact of systematic discrimination on the current state of
African Americans, the Justices nevertheless suggested that a few decades or even one generation
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should be long enough to address the entrenched subordination of African Americans and to
dismantle white dominance.112
D. Gratz v. Bollinger113
In this companion case to Grutter, strict scrutiny was fatal to a program that was
conceptually similar to the Grutter program. Here, two white Michigan residents rejected from
the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA) sued alleging the
undergraduate admissions process discriminated against them because of their race and violated
their equal protection rights.114 The challenged admissions policy automatically awarded twenty
points to the score of underrepresented minority applicants of the total one hundred points needed
for admission to LSA.115 In reviewing the policy under strict scrutiny, the Court determined that
automatically giving twenty points to minority applicants was not a narrowly tailored method of
achieving diversity and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.116 The Court reaffirmed that race may be considered as a “plus” factor in admissions
policies that provide for individual consideration of applicants, however, race cannot be the
decisive factor.117
Justice Souter dissented, reasoning that the LSA admissions program resembled the
constitutionally valid policy in Grutter because of its broad conception of diversity and its use of
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race as one factor of many.118 Justice Souter further asserted that it is impossible to determine
whether race was the decisive factor for admissions.119
Justice Ginsburg, also dissenting, pointed to the legacy of racial oppression to justify a
lesser standard of scrutiny for race-based actions meant to remediate centuries of legally
sanctioned inequality.120 Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg concluded that whether an action has the
purpose of maintaining racial inequality or the purpose of preventing perpetual discrimination and
undoing the effects of past discrimination is discernible and should dictate whether the
Constitution should be “color blind” or “color conscious.” 121 The Justice concluded that the
Constitution is “color conscious” when it comes to remedying the impact of past discrimination,
which should not be confused with invidious race-based actions.122
E. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin123
In response to the Grutter decision, which overruled Hopwood by allowing the use of race
in admissions policies, the University of Texas at Austin adopted a new admissions program
comprised of two components.124 The first component was based on a state legislated Top Ten
Percent Plan—offering admission to Texas high school students graduating in the top 10% of their
class—and accounted for approximately 75% of the incoming freshman class, and the second
component involved a holistic approach that considered race as one of several factors for
admission.125 The Top Ten Percent Plan was enacted in response to Hopwood, which declared
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that public university admissions policies could not consider race, and guaranteed admission to the
top 10% of high school graduates from Texas’ segregated schools.126 The second component of
the admissions program, admitting the remaining 25% of the freshman class, incorporated a
holistic review process modeled after Grutter, where race was “but a factor of a factor” and not
the decisive factor.127
The University denied admission to Fisher, a white woman, who was not in the top ten
percent of her graduating class.128 Fisher sued claiming that the University of Texas’ consideration
of race in its holistic admissions review process disadvantaged her and other white applicants in
violation of their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.129 The Supreme Court
vacated the judgment in Fisher I 130 and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals so the
admissions program could be properly evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard.131 On remand,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the University.132 Granting certiorari
a second time, the Court held that the University’s holistic admissions program was constitutional
because (1) its pursuit of diversity was a compelling government interest, (2) the University
showed that race-neutral alternatives did not work, and (3) the program was narrowly tailored.133
While this close decision upheld the University of Texas’ affirmative action admissions
program, the Court was divided.134 Justice Thomas dissented, concluding that the use of race in
admissions decisions is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment and that Grutter should be
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overruled.135 Justice Alito, dissenting, reasoned that affirmative action admissions programs were
equivalent to “systematic racial discrimination” and that the University of Texas failed to provide
an adequate explanation for its admissions program and did not pass the strict scrutiny test.136
The fact that the Justices, when presented with the same facts, studies, and history, can be
so divided as to the legitimacy of affirmative action suggests such programs face a very uncertain
future that will largely be determined by the Court’s composition.

More importantly, the

reluctance of conservative Justices to acknowledge the present-day impact of the legally
sanctioned subjugation of African Americans over centuries makes it doubtful that the Court will
allow equal protection law to dismantle white domination.
IV.

The Strict Scrutiny Attack on Affirmative Action Admissions Policies

In the 1960s the Court applied strict scrutiny to race-based policies that “enforced
segregation and white supremacy.”137 Conservative leaning Courts began applying strict scrutiny
to affirmative action programs in the 1970s and 1980s as a tool to strike down affirmative action
programs as unconstitutional.138 During this time period, the Court began to focus on the use of
forbidden racial classifications rather than the underlying structural inequalities affecting African
Americans and other minorities that the affirmative action policies were designed to address.139
In Bakke, the Court declared that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.” 140 The Court rejected the
University’s request that the Court use a more lenient standard of review based on the assertion
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that white men were not “discrete and insular minorit[ies].”141 The Court refused to accept the
University’s claim that “discrimination against members of the white ‘majority’ cannot be suspect
if the purpose can be characterized as benign.” 142 This decision equated policies designed to
remedy racial discrimination and subordination with policies designed to achieve and maintain
white domination by considering them equally suspect. The Bakke Court interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause in accordance with its recent “crucial mission” of extending the clause to all
persons, not just to African Americans.143
By applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action admissions policies, the Court created an
exceptionally high bar for race-conscious policies to survive. In order to pass strict scrutiny review,
race-based affirmative action policies must (1) demonstrate a compelling government interest and
(2) show that the use of race is necessary and narrowly tailored.144 The Court could have allowed
for a more lenient standard of review for race-based programs created to remedy the impact of the
unconstitutional subjugation of African Americans given the unique history of the United States
and its ruthless subordination of African Americans over centuries.
In order for public universities to satisfy strict scrutiny, they must demonstrate a
compelling government interest. 145 Under the Court’s approach, remedying private “societal
discrimination” is not a constitutionally viable compelling interest.146 Unless a public university
can show that it engaged in past, intentional discrimination that has present effects, a public
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university cannot justify the use of race-based admissions policies to address the obvious inequities
in access to public higher education, especially for African Americans.147
Oddly, the one compelling interest (other than a university’s own past discrimination) that
the Supreme Court has upheld for using race-based affirmative action policies is the attainment of
the educational benefits of a diverse student body.148 This compelling interest has become a “legal
fiction” as universities are forced to contort their admissions programs to comply with a strict
scrutiny standard that refuses to acknowledge the compelling government interest in remedying
unequal educational opportunities for African Americans and other minorities. The reality of
unequal educational opportunities for African Americans is evidenced regularly when educational
outcome indicators are measured, yet the Court requires universities to ignore these realities.149
The refusal to acknowledge how states have unconstitutionally, through law and policy, created
and contributed to a new form of unequal and segregated education systems dramatically limits
the scope of affirmative action policies.150
V.

De Jure Segregation and the Miseducation of African Americans

A. Unconstitutional Government Policies and Laws Promoted De Jure Segregation
Federal, state, and local government laws and policies created America’s segregated cities
and neighborhoods that continue to exist today.151 A prime example is Richmond, California, a
shipbuilding center during World War II where the influx of wartime workers led to a housing
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shortage. 152 During this period, the black population alone grew from 270 to 14,000. 153 In
response to the acute housing shortage and the need for the workers, the federal government
provided public housing that was “officially and explicitly” segregated with substandard,
temporary housing built for African Americans in the least desirable areas.154 To limit the African
American population in Richmond to only those who were “essential to the war effort,” black men
were stopped on Richmond streets and arrested if they could not prove they had employment
related to the war.155
In addition to providing segregated public housing, the federal government began to
subsidize the whites-only movement to suburban communities across the nation. For example, the
federal government recruited a developer to create a whites-only suburb for Richmond, called
Rollingwood, and then financed the project with federally approved bank loans with the condition
that African Americans could not buy any of the 700 homes. 156 This practice of government
financing whites-only suburbs was not equal protection under the law. The patterns of segregation
established by federally funded housing, both public housing and suburban housing, was
widespread and persists today.157
Governments used racial zoning as another method to segregate African Americans.
Beginning in 1910, racial zoning ordinances prohibited African Americans from buying houses in
white areas.158 In the 1917 case of Buchanan v. Warley, the Supreme Court struck down a racial
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zoning ordinance in Louisville, Kentucky, as interfering with the right to “freedom of contract.”159
Justifications for racial zoning ranged from keeping the public peace to preventing illegal
interracial marriage.160 Many racial zoning ordinances persisted into the 1960s (some longer) and
these ordinances solidified segregation of the nation.161
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created in 1934 to promote homeownership by middle-class families and required that eligible homes be in whites-only
neighborhoods, officially mandating racial segregation to participate in the federal mortgage
program. 162 The FHA financed Levittown, an enormous 17,500 home development, on the
condition that the homes could only be sold to whites.163 Only white World War II veterans could
buy Levittown properties with no down payment and low-interest loans guaranteed by the
government.164
In 1973, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that the “housing industry, aided and
abetted by Government, must bear the primary responsibility for the legacy of segregated
housing.”165 To attribute today’s segregation to merely private choices or societal discrimination,
denies the reality that African Americans were systematically herded into specific neighborhoods
and were denied equal access to jobs, education, housing, and financing for housing.166
B. Segregation and Education
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The landmark 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education was a crucial turning point in the
relationship between equal protection law and African Americans.167 This long overdue decision
overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson that permitted states to use their
laws to subordinate African Americans.168 As a result of the Brown decision, equal protection of
African Americans in the context of the right to educational opportunities led to reforms and
schools integration.169 This equal protection of African Americans, however, was short-lived due
to a backlash against civil rights reforms and the ultimate change in direction of equal protection
law described above.170
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, parents in Seattle
challenged the school district’s use of white and nonwhite classifications in its assignment plan for
oversubscribed high schools, and a parent in Kentucky challenged the assignment plan for
elementary schools and transfer requests using “black” or “other” classifications.171 The common
issue was whether a public school district that had not previously maintained legally segregated
schools or a previously segregated school district that was deemed integrated may voluntarily use
racial classifications when making school assignments.172 The Court concluded that these school
cases were not governed by Grutter because the compelling interest in a diverse student body in
the higher education context does not apply to race-based assignments in elementary and
secondary schools where the court determined the racial classifications were simply used for
illegitimate racial balancing.173 The Court held that the districts failed to satisfy strict scrutiny by
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showing the use of racial classifications in assigning students was necessary to achieve their goal
of diversity.174 Using a novel interpretation of Brown, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that racial
integration was not a compelling interest and concluded that the goal of voluntarily promoting and
maintaining integration was unconstitutional.175
Justice Stevens, dissenting, noted the irony of Chief Justice Roberts’ reliance on Brown
and his rewriting of “the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions.”176 Justice Breyer,
also dissenting, noted that the majority’s opinion “distorts precedent, it misapplies the relevant
constitutional principles, and it announces legal rules that will obstruct” government efforts to
contend with the problem of re-segregation of public schools.177 This decision is a classic example
of the Court changing the direction of equal protection law from remedying structural inequality
resulting from centuries of subordination to merely focusing on the use of race as a classification.
Chief Justice Roberts literally reinterpreted Brown to stand for the determination that voluntary
integration is unconstitutional.
The impact of segregation on the education of African Americans should not be
underestimated.178 Educational policy alone cannot adequately address the unequal educational
opportunities suffered by African American children; to successfully address the racial academic
achievement gap, strategies must combat the economic isolation resulting from the segregation of
African Americans in addition to school reforms. 179 The quality of education is linked to the
segregation of African Americans.180 Residential integration, school integration, and increasing
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economic parity need to be effectively addressed to promote equal educational opportunities.181
Racial and economic segregation of neighborhoods and schools are “key factors” in the racial
academic achievement gaps found in American cities.182
VI.

Higher Education of African Americans as a Compelling Government Interest

Beginning with Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke, the Supreme Court began to recognize
the goal of attaining the educational benefits of a diverse student body as a compelling government
interest to justify the use of race in affirmative action admissions policies. 183 This is the one
compelling interest where the Court has upheld the use of race in admissions policies, other than
a university’s remedying the present effects of its own past discrimination.184 Because the Court
refuses to acknowledge the reality of unequal educational opportunities for African Americans that
universities would like to address in their admissions policies, universities must create admissions
policies that fit within this ill-fitting concept of “educational benefits of a diverse student body.”185
Constitutionally, the government must remedy the present effects of its own past discrimination.186
Therefore, the government’s past discrimination leading to systematic de jure segregation and
resulting in the miseducation of African Americans should be considered a compelling government
interest that can be remedied by public universities and private universities receiving public
funding.
Originally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with the other
reconstruction amendments, protected the rights of African Americans.187 The federal, state, and
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local government action that promoted de jure segregation violated and continues to violate the
constitutional rights of African Americans. The effects of de jure segregation flowing from such
state action as discriminatory housing, employment, and education policies impact African
Americans today and continue to manifest in the enduring unequal educational opportunities for
African Americans. 188 Because government action is responsible for unconstitutional de jure
segregation and the resulting miseducation of African Americans, the government has a
compelling interest in remedying the harmful effects of its actions.189 When applied to the context
of affirmative action in admissions, perhaps one question is whether an individual has a slave
ancestor to invoke equal protection remediation specifically obligated because of the government’s
unconstitutional treatment of African Americans.
As discussed in Brown v. Board of Education, the evolution of public education requires
the Supreme Court to consider the present impact of segregation on public education and
education’s current place in American society.190 Because a bachelor’s degree today is arguably
equivalent to a high school diploma of decades ago and there is a need for skilled workers in
today’s job market, the Brown decision should be extended to include public higher education.191
Providing public higher education should also be viewed as a “most important function of state
and local government” and as “a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”192
The question that must be addressed is whether African Americans are being equally
protected under the law when it comes to higher public education. Are public universities
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segregated institutions that are intentionally keeping African Americans out? Given the unequal
education of African Americans, is their right to equal protection violated by subjecting them to
the same standards for standardized test scores as the privileged white class? By not addressing
the reality of the multigenerational disparity in educational opportunities between white and black
Americans, facially neutral admissions policies may really be the equivalent to “white affirmative
action.”

VII.

Conclusion

The African American experience in America is relevant and must be considered when
reviewing policies designed to mitigate the systematic oppression of African Americans as a result
of unconstitutional government actions. Remedying the effects of de jure segregation on the
miseducation of African Americans is a compelling government interest that supports the
strengthening of affirmative action admissions programs to safeguard the rights of African
Americans under the Equal Protection Clause. Given the level of education required to be
successful in today’s workforce and the move towards free public higher education (e.g., New
York State), higher public education must be open and accessible to African Americans. It is no
longer sufficient to have access to only a primary and secondary education. Finally, the privileges
of white domination enjoyed by and benefitting generations of whites cannot be left out of the
analyses when determining the constitutionality of necessary reforms.
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